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• Purpose: leverage the lessons learned from the Foundational Terminal 
Operations human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation to test a DAA system 
better suited to the terminal environment
• Objectives:
– Implement two candidates for a terminal area DAA well clear (DWC) definition
– Further investigate the efficacy of the DAA Corrective alert in the terminal area
– Compare pilot and system performance to previous studies
Objective
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• Phase 1 DWC definition resulted in an exceedingly high number of alerts in 
the terminal area 
– As a result pilots had a hard time judging when a maneuver was necessary to 
avoid high-severity LoDWC
• 17 > 50% SLoWC &  6 > 70% SLoWC
• No SLoWC above 30% in PT6
• The DAA Corrective alert was shown to be less useful in the terminal area
– Best performance seen in configuration with DAA Warning but no Corrective
– Pilots rarely coordinated with tower before maneuvering against intruders
– Intruders often spent < 15sec as Corrective before transitioning to Warning
• Encounters that occurred with ownship established on final were the most 
likely to lead to severe losses of DWC
TOPS 1 Results Summary
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• 2 x 2 Mixed-Factorial Design
– DWC Candidate (Within-Subjects):
– Alerting Configuration (Between-Subjects)
• No Corrective = No DAA Corrective alert or guidance, all other alerting/guidance 
remains
• With Corrective = Full Phase 1 MOPS DAA alerting and guidance structure (Class I)
Experimental Design
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No Tau Tau
Horizontal Threshold* 1500ft 1500ft
Vertical Threshold 450ft 450ft
modTau N/A 15sec
*HMD in Tau definition
Experimental Design
Symbol Name Time to Hazard Zone
Warning Alert 30sec
Corrective Alert 45sec
Preventive Alert 45sec
Guidance Traffic N/A
Remaining Traffic N/A
Symbol Name Time to Hazard Zone
Warning Alert 30sec
Preventive 
Alert 45sec
Remaining 
Traffic N/A
With Corrective
All Remain & Regain 
DWC Guidance
Includes Only Warning 
Guidance and Regain DWC 
Guidance
No Corrective
Alerting Criteria for DWC Candidates
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Symbol Name Pilot Action No Tau
DWC Criteria
Tau
DWC Criteria
Time to 
Loss of DWC
Aural Alert
Verbiage
4 Warning Alert
• Notify ATC as soon as 
practicable after taking 
action
Horz = 1500ft
ZTHR = 450 ft
DMOD = 1500ft
HMD = 1500ft
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 15 sec
30 sec
“Traffic, 
Maneuver
Now”  x2
3 Corrective Alert
• Coordinate with ATC to 
determine an appropriate 
maneuver
Horz = 1500ft
ZTHR = 450 ft
DMOD = 1500ft
HMD = 1500ft
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 15 sec
45 sec “Traffic,Avoid”
2 Preventive Alert
• On current course, 
corrective action should 
not be required
Horz = 1500ft
ZTHR = 700 ft
DMOD = 1500ft
HMD = 1500ft
ZTHR = 700 ft
modTau = 15 sec
45 sec “Traffic, Monitor”
1 Guidance Traffic
• Traffic generating guidance 
bands outside of current 
course
Associated w/ 
bands outside 
current course
Associated w/ 
bands outside 
current course
X N/A
0 Remaining Traffic • Traffic within sensor range
Within 
surveillance
field of regard
Within 
surveillance field 
of regard
X N/A
NOTES:
• Corrective alert only present in With Corrective alerting configuration
• No sensor uncertainty was modeled
• Alerting criteria was identical between DWC Candidates
• Generic MQ-9 Reaper
– Speed:
• Cruise: 110 knots
• Landing: 90-110 knots
• Min: 70 knots
– Default Climb/Descent Rate: 
• 1000ft/min
– Roll:
• Max: +/- 20°
• Rate: 5°/sec
– Pitch:
• Max: +/- 10°
• Rate: 1°/sec
Aircraft Flight Model
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• Ground control station (GCS) contains:
1. Viewer Tool – contains approach plate & airport facility directory (AFD)
2. Tactical Situation Display (TSD) – DAA information and vehicle control interfaces 
3. Right Panel – landing checklist and additional info
4. Voice communication panel – touchscreen, transmit/receive on select freqs.
Ground Control Station (GCS)
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Vigilant Spirit Control Station (AFRL)
• Primary = Rwy14
• Runway 14/32
– Length = 6000ft x 150ft
– RNAV (GPS)
• Elevation = 129ft
• Traffic Pattern = 1150ft
• Downwind offsets:
– Left = ~1.5nm
– Right = ~0.5nm
• Runway 20/02
– Not used
Sonoma County Airport
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Traffic Pattern Altitude = 1150ft
3NM  (WP1) to RW14 (WP2) = 3nm
RW14 (WP2) to RW32 (WP3)  = 1nm
• Pseudo-pilots monitored and managed all manned traffic (IFR & VFR)
– Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS) software suite
• Air Traffic Control managed UAS and manned traffic
– Tower controller managing Santa Rosa (KSTS)
– Center controller managing Oakland Center (ZOA 40/41)
– Sector traffic modeled using real sector activity and data
• All participants communicated via push-to-talk headsets
– KSTS Tower frequency: 118.50
– Oakland Center frequency: 127.80
– KSTS ATIS: 120.55
Simulation Components
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• Pilots trained first on the ground control station followed by training on the 
DAA system
– Trained on the meaning of each alert/guidance type in their given configuration
– Practice en-route scenario flown with conflicts & ATC in-the-loop
• Pilots trained last on how to fly the given approach
– 2 practice approaches flown, one with a scripted conflict
• Informed that a DAA system has been specifically developed to support 
terminal operations 
– Told the hazard zone was 1500ft x 450ft (did not explain tau component)
v Told to use the DAA system to maintain DAA well clear from traffic in the 
terminal environment (i.e., expected to utilize the alerts/guidance)
Training on DAA System
11
• Participants flew 2 types of approaches into Santa Rosa Rwy 14 under 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
– Instrument (RNAV GPS) Approach
– “Visual” Approach
• Common across scenarios:
– Start in Vigilant Spirit’s HOLDS mode & in Oakland center airspace
– Coordinate transfer to KSTS Tower
– Perform checklist actions as able (e.g., check ATIS, brief approach)
– Fly final in Vigilant Spirit’s NAV mode (enables glide slope)
Scenario Design
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Scenario Design
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Instrument Approach Notes:
• Final approach coarse offset 15°
• Missed approach procedures = climb to 
5000ft, fly runway heading (143°)
“Visual” Approach Notes:
• Airport “in sight” 10-12nm from runway
• Line up for 3nm final stabilized approach
• Traffic pattern @ 1150ft
• Go-around = climb to pattern alt (1150ft)
• Pilots flew 4 trials per day (2 Instrument & 2 Visual)
• 4 approaches flown per trial (= ~45min per trial)
• The following encounter types occurred every trial:
• Turn Into = traffic blunders into UA on final and will result in NMAC without UAS pilot 
response [1 per trial]
• Turn In Front = traffic turns in front of UAS with sufficient separation (~1.5-2nm) to 
land safely (the turn is coordinated w/ Tower) [1 per trial]
• Unscripted = no encounter is scripted to occur but traffic expected to be on 
downwind as UAS is on final [2 per trial]
• Encounter type breakdown:
Scenarios
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Blunder? Predicted HorzSep@ CPA
Corrective or Warning 
Alert Desired?
Maneuver 
Desired?
Turn Into Yes ~0nm Yes Yes
Turn In Front No ~1.5-2nm No No
Unscripted No N/A No No
• Participants
– 16 UAS pilot participants (avg. age = 33 years)
• All IFR rated with manned & unmanned flying experience
– Manned experience = avg. 1000 civilian flight hours, 1600 military flight hours
– Unmanned experience = avg. 500 civilian flight hours, 700 military flight hours
– 2 retired tower controllers served as tower controller confederates
– 1 ATC SME served as center controller confederate
– 4 current general aviation pilots served as manned traffic confederates
Participants
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RESULTS
16
DAA ALERTING AND MEASURED RESPONSE
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• 32 total alerts desired per DWC candidate
= 16 [pilots] * 2 [trials per pilot] * 1 [Turn Into encounter per trial)]
• There was also 1 Turn In Front encounter per trial
• 215 different intruders registered (in truth) as a DAA alert
– “Truth” alerts = all alerts captured by the DAA system, across all trials and 
conditions (ignores alert configuration variable)
• The Tau DWC candidate alerted more frequently overall, a consequence of 
disproportionately alerting to Unscripted traffic
DAA Alerting Statistics
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• More Corrective (truth) alerts 
issued when Tau DWC 
definition used
– No Tau = 42 total
– Tau = 75 total
• Majority of these Corrective 
alerts lasted less than 6sec
– NOTE: 4sec is min. alert 
duration
– Most did not progress to a 
Warning alert
• No Tau = 17/22 (77%) 
• Tau = 44/53 (83%)
• Avg. Corrective alert duration
– No Tau = 6.9sec
• Median = 5sec
– Tau = 7.5sec
• Median = 5sec
– Typically allot 10-15sec for ATC 
coordination
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Corrective Alert Duration – Tau DWC Candidate
• Corrective (truth) alerts 
least common during the 
Turn Into encounter types
– Only 13 Corrective 
alerts issued against 
Turn Into encounters
• Correctives more 
common with Turn In 
Front & Unscripted 
encounters
– Turn In Front = 30
– Unscripted = 74
• Avg. Corrective duration
– Turn Into = 10.8sec
• Median = 9sec
– Turn In Front = 9.6sec
• Median = 5sec
– Unscripted = 5.5sec
• Median = 5sec
Corrective Alert Duration
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• More Warning (truth) alerts 
issued when Tau DWC 
definition used 
– No Tau = 40
– Tau = 67
• Warnings typically lasted less 
than 10sec
– However, Tau candidate led 
to more alerts w/ 20sec 
duration
• Avg. Warning alert duration
– No Tau = 10.9sec
• Median = 8sec
– Tau = 12.4sec
• Median = 8sec
Warning Alert Duration
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• Warning (truth) alerts 
most common during the 
Turn Into encounter types
– 58 Warning alerts issued 
against Turn Into 
encounters
• Warnings less common 
with Turn In Front & 
Unscripted encounters
– Turn In Front = 16
– Unscripted = 33
• Avg. Warning duration
– Turn Into = 15.2sec
• Median = 15sec
– Turn In Front = 7.3sec
• Median = 6sec
– Unscripted = 7.5sec
• Median = 6sec
Warning Alert Duration
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• Aircraft Response Time = time to upload a maneuver to the aircraft following the 
onset of a Corrective or Warning alert (whichever appeared first)
• Difficult to capture response times to Corrective alerts – not visible in all conditions 
and (as shown earlier) they were typically of short duration 
• Pilots respond slightly faster to Warning alerts in the No Tau DWC condition
– Later alerting w/ No Tau means that the threat is often more apparent by the time an 
alert is issued
Aircraft Response Time
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Alert Type
Aircraft RT by DWC Candidate & Alert Type
SEPARATION DATA
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• Loss of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC) Criteria:
– No Tau: Horz=1500ft, Vert=450ft, no tau
– Tau: Horz=1500ft, Vert=450ft, 15sec modTau, 1500ft DMOD
• For reference: 82 LoDWC in TOPS 1 against similar encounters
• Tau had 10 more LoDWC than No Tau (also had larger hazard zone)
– Tau candidate had more than twice as many LoDWC in the With Corrective alerting 
configuration
Losses of DAA Well Clear (Counts)
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• Proportion of losses of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC)
– # of LoDWC / # aircraft that generated a DAA Corrective or Warning
• For All Encounters, identical proportion of LoDWC between No Tau and Tau DWC 
candidates
• LoDWC was most common against Turn Into encounters 
– 32 total were scripted (per condition), but one encounter failed to generate in each
– Twice as many LoDWC with Tau candidate
• 0 LoDWC in Turn In Front encounter type
• 3 total LoDWC against Unscripted encounters (all in Tau condition)
Losses of DAA Well Clear (Proportions)
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• Phase 1 SLoWC = % of the Phase 1 DAA well clear volume (which includes 
tau) penetrated by intruder
– Higher % = greater penetration
• No substantial effect of DWC candidate or alerting configuration
– No Tau & Tau DWC candidates led to 
Losses of DAA Well Clear (Severity)
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• Phase 1 SLoWC ranged overall from 20-72%
– Highest SLoWC seen in With Corrective alerting configuration
• Fewer high-severity SLoWC with current DWC candidates than seen in TOPS 1
Losses of DAA Well Clear (Severity)
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• Closest point defined as minimum slant range with vertical separation < 450ft
• 22% (4/18) of LoDWC in the Tau DWC candidate came within 1500ft horiziontal
separation (i.e., violated the No Tau candidate criteria)
– 4 intruders came within 1215ft horizontal separation (the lower-bound recommendation)
Actual Separation at Closest Point in LoDWC
29NMAC TOPS 1B
Legend:
No Tau
Tau
• Closest point defined as minimum slant range with vertical separation < 450ft
• Tau candidate adds approximately 1000ft additional minimum horizontal separation
• Minimum vertical constant across the four conditions
• No clear effect of alerting configuration
Avg. Minimum Separation at Closest Point in LoDWC
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• Pilot responsible for LoDWC:
– 38% (3/8) of time with No Tau candidate
– 33% (6/18) of time with Tau candidate
• Only one entered No Tau boundary
• Late acceleration was a disproportionate 
contributor to LoDWC
– 38% (3/8) of time with No Tau
– 56% (10/18) of time with Tau
• Proportion of LoDWC drops significantly 
when only including pilot-responsible
Losses of DAA Well Clear (Causes)
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LoDWC Causes No Tau Tau
Pilot 
Responsible
Pilot Hesitation 1 3
Insufficient Vertical Maneuver 1 2
Ineffective Maneuver 1 1
Pilot Not 
Responsible
Late Acceleration 3 10
Intruder Mis-Flown 1 2
No Safe Maneuver 1 0
Total 8 18
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• SLoWC drops substantially when only including pilot-
responsible LoDWC
– Approx. reduction of 12-16% SLoWC
– No noticeable difference between DWC candidates
• The No Tau candidate had 0 SLoWC above 50% with 
pilot responsible
• The Tau candidate had 2 SLoWC above 50% & 0
SLoWC above 70% (both due to ‘pilot hesitation’)
– For reference: TOPS 1 had 17 SLoWC above 50% & 6 
SLoWC above 70% with pilot responsible
Losses of DAA Well Clear (Causes)
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MANEUVERING & ATC INTEROPERABILITY
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• Heading changes and missed approaches (or go-arounds in visual scenario) were most likely in 
the Turn Into encounter type
– Even split between heading changes and missed approaches
• Pilots relied on speed reductions almost exclusively to resolve perceived conflicts in the Turn In 
Front and Unscripted encounter types
– Larger number of maneuvers seen for Tau DWC candidate, largely a result of more speed decreases 
against Unscripted encounters
Initial Maneuver Types
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• Pilots were most consistent when coordinating a missed approach/go-around
– Pilots fairly consistent in coordinating heading changes, slightly more so in Tau condition
• Speed decreases were rarely coordinated
• ATC coordination was ~20% in TOPS 1
• When pilots did coordinate, it was typically after they had made their maneuver
– 67% of coordination occurred after the maneuver had been made (identical rate for 
missed & non-missed approach maneuvers)
Coordination With the Tower
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• Both DWC candidates appropriately tailored to the operational 
environment
– Substantially fewer high-severity LoDWC than TOPS 1
• The 2 candidates had identical avg. Phase 1 SLoWC when including only pilot-
responsible
– Response times returned to expected averages (consistent with PT6)
– Pilots did not report noticing a difference between the candidates during 
debrief
• Tau candidate generated more alerts and more LoDWC, however:
– Tau candidate led to more LoDWC overall but they typically stayed outside of 
the 1500ft x 450ft boundary
– Additional alerts not found to correspond with more disruptive maneuvers –
pilots relied heavily on speed reductions
• Corrective alerts continue to show lack of utility in the terminal area
– Corrective duration grand mean = 7sec (median = 5sec)
– 81% (61/75) of time short duration Correctives failed to progress to a Warning
– Pilot performance in the No Corrective alerting configuration either did not
differ from or was better than performance in With Corrective condition
Conclusions
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BACKUP
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DAA Alerting & Guidance
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• After each encounter, tower controller answered the following questions:
• Tower rated UAS behaviors as overwhelmingly appropriate
– UA pilots were able to detect appropriate traffic
– Disruptive turn-outs on instrument approach where pilots should have executed missed approach 
– 1.5 nm separation on approach worked for simulation
• Pilot responses to traffic on final was left to their discretion – although training emphasized 
the expectation to go missed/go-around
– During debrief pilots explained that they (often) reflexively looked to make a heading change as a way 
to immediately increase separation
– Altitude bands typically indicated that a climb would not resolve the conflict
Controller & Pilot Feedback
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• Tau DWC candidate had far more instances of a DAA alert that did not lead to a UAS 
maneuver
– No Tau = 7 alerts w/o maneuver
– Tau = 40 alerts w/o maneuver
• 62% (29/47) of these cases were against a Corrective alert
• None of these alerts resulted in a loss of DWC
– Avg. alert duration = 6sec
DAA Alerts Without a Maneuver
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• 40 total maneuvers were made against traffic that did not register a DAA 
alert
– Evenly distributed between the 2 DWC candidates
• Maneuvers were typically speed decreases to provide enough space for 
aircraft in front
– No Tau had minority of climbs and heading changes against non-alerted traffic
Maneuvers Without a DAA Alert
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• Tau candidate was far more likely to alert to unscripted traffic, particularly jet traffic 
and traffic turning to base
– Jet traffic approached KSTS from the NE before getting established on a 5nm straight-in; 
during the Instrument approach scenario, it briefly pointed at UA
• Discrepancy between conditions is smaller when comparing # of maneuvers
– No Tau candidate actually led to more maneuvers than alerts; Tau candidate had ~1/2 as 
many maneuvers than alerts
• Count of Corrective/Warning alerts and maneuvers against unscripted traffic types 
by DWC candidate:
Unscripted Encounter Types
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Unscripted Traffic 
Location
No Tau
at First Corr/Warn
Tau
at First Corr/Warn
No Tau
at Maneuver
Tau
at Maneuver
Turn to Base 12 32 8 11
Jet Traffic 0 24 2 5
Right Downwind 5 9 6 4
Left Downwind 0 3 2 2
Base 1 1 6 7
Final 0 1 2 9
Total 18 70 26 38
• Speed changes were the most common 
type of maneuver made (94 total)
• Missed Approaches & Heading Changes 
were equally common (43 vs. 42)
– Missed approach more prevalent in 
Instrument
– Heading changes more common in Visual
• Pilots occasionally saved their missed 
approach for a later upload
Maneuvers Made by Scenario Type
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• Worst case was with the Tau DWC candidate, With Corrective alert config.
– Instrument scenario
– ‘Late Acceleration’ – lost DWC at the same time it became a warning
– Pilot exacerbated it by turning with the traffic and delaying a climb
Highest SLoWC Encounter
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• No Tau candidate had fewer 
alerts
– None occurred far away from 
the 2 downwind legs
• Tau candidate had more alerts 
overall with several occurring 
far away from runway
– Tau candidate was more 
consistent in where the 
intruder was at first alert
Intruder Location at First Alert
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• How did pilots continue the approach 
when they maneuvered for traffic but 
did not go missed?
– Re-Engage: turn back to final and/or 
continue descent
– Runway Heading: turn back toward 
runway without engaging descent 
– Re-Fly: made a 360 or enter the 
right/left downwind to re-do the 
approach entirely
• In Instrument scenario, pilots most 
often tried to re-engage the 
approach
• In Visual scenario, pilots most often 
re-flew the approach
Return Type
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• LoDWC_LaRC typically started with ownship established on final with intruder still 
near right/left downwind (likely at the start of the turn base)
Ownship & Intruder Location at Start of all LoDWC_LaRC
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Legend:
Ownship Position, Instrument Approach
Ownship Position, Visual Approach
Intruder Position, Instrument Approach
Intruder Position, Visual Approach
• CPA typically occurred once the intruder neared or crossed our final approach path
Ownship & Intruder Location at CPA (for all LoDWC_LaRC)
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Legend:
Ownship Position, Instrument Approach
Ownship Position, Visual Approach
Intruder Position, Instrument Approach
Intruder Position, Visual Approach
